Do you ever wonder why, if the Constitution created a Federal government with very limited powers, why the Federal government today seems so powerful? A lot has to deal with a very poorly reasoned Supreme Court case dealing with a simple farmer who grew wheat, not for sale, but rather used to feed his chickens and his own family.
Wickard v. Filburn, 317 US 111 (1942), is one of the most important cases dealing with the commerce clause, and, in my opinion, one of the worst decisions of the Supreme Court, ranking up there just below the Dredd Scott decision in its absurdity. Roscoe Filburn was an Ohio farmer who grew wheat for his family’s personal consumption and to feed his chickens. He did not sell any of the wheat in interstate commerce. However, Congress had passed a law limiting how much wheat farmers could grow in an attempt to regulate the price of wheat in interstate commerce. Mr. Filburn was told he could plant just over 11 acres of wheat. Instead, he planted and harvested about 23 acres of wheat. Although over his allotment, it was hardly a significant amount of wheat. Mr. Filburn was fined for growing too much wheat and he fought the fine. The case went all the way to the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court, under pressure from the President to pack the Court if it did not start issuing rulings the way President Roosevelt wanted it to, upheld the fine in a decision written by Justice Jackson.
Prior to this decision, the Court had looked at cases and differentiated between agriculture, manufacturing, and commerce. Things such as agriculture and manufacturing were considered local and therefore part of intrastate, not interstate commerce. Therefore, Congress had no authority to regulate those processes. However, in the Filburn case, the Supreme Court changed course and determined that although Mr. Filburn did not engage in interstate commerce, the very fact that he did not engage in interstate commerce because he grew his wheat for his own consumption, affected interstate commerce by reducing the demand for wheat and thereby increasing the amount available in interstate commerce for others. If everyone were to do this, it would have a substantial affect upon interstate commerce. Because of this substantial affect, Congress could regulate how much wheat Mr. Filburn could grow under its authority to regulate interstate commerce.
This decision vastly increased the power of the Federal government far beyond what the Framers ever envisioned and well beyond any grant of authority ever given to the Federal government by the people. Plain and simply, it was a power grab. Under this reasoning, the Federal government could now make laws affecting every aspect of life. Congress could now control the sale and use of guns because of their affect on interstate commerce. Congress could control who people talk to on the phone because of interstate commerce. Government could create the Department of Education, the Environmental Protection Agency, and many other agencies because of real or imaginary links to interstate commerce even though the Constitution never delegated the authority to the Federal government to act in these areas. These were areas that were supposed to be left to the States.
There have been some good results in other cases that relied on Filburn, but the results were obtained for the wrong reason and could have still been achieved using proper Constitutional authority. One such case was Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 US 241 (1964). In Heart of Atlanta, a Georgia motel refused to rent rooms to black patrons, in violation of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 which banned discrimination in places of public accommodations. The Supreme Court held that the Civil Rights Act of 1964 was constitutional as a valid exercise of Congress’ power to regulate interstate commerce. While I agree, unlike Filburn, this case has a connection to interstate commerce in that people traveling between states can more substantially affect interstate commerce than a farmer simply growing wheat for his personal consumption, the law itself is not a regulation of interstate commerce. Additionally, it would have no connection to interstate commerce if the person denied accommodation was a citizen on the same state in which the motel was located. What the court should have done was take advantage of this case to follow the lead of Justice Douglas and Justice Goldberg in their concurring opinions and overturn the Court’s ruling in the Civil Rights Cases decision. In the Civil Rights Cases, the Supreme Court invalidated the Civil Rights Act of 1875 saying it was an unconstitutional exercise of Congress’ power to pass a law requiring individual citizens not to discriminate in public accommodations. Justice Harlan’s dissent pointed out that the Act was a valid act of Congress’ authority under the 5th Section of the 14th amendment to ensure that regardless of race, citizens were to be protected in all their rights and privileges, and under the 13th Amendment as a law to remove the “badges and incidents of slavery.”
In their concurring opinions in Heart of Atlanta, Justices Douglas and Goldberg raised again the issue raised by Justice Harlan. Justice Douglas addressed head on the view of the court in the Civil Rights Cases regarding lack of State action. He reasoned that there was State action when State officials and courts enforced the discrimination through arrests and trials for trespass.
I agree with Justice Douglas and what he said in his concurring opinion in Heart of Atlanta, “I repeat what I said earlier, that our decision should be based on the Fourteenth Amendment, thereby putting an end to all obstructionist strategies and allowing every person — whatever his race, creed, or color — to patronize all places of public accommodation without discrimination whether he travels interstate or intrastate.” This position contains much stronger legal reasoning, provided for stronger equal protection for all, and remained truer to the original understanding of the Constitution and the Commerce Clause, than deciding this case, and other civil rights cases, as a valid exercise of Congress’ power to regulate interstate commerce.
